How US-Israeli war on Iran has eclipsed the crisis in Sudan

After six weeks of escalating violence in the US-Israeli war on Iran, a fragile two-week ceasefire was brokered by Pakistan in early April, with peace talks taking place this past weekend in Islamabad. 

But with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying Tel Aviv has its “finger on the trigger” to resume war at any moment, and US President Donald Trump warning of devastating consequences if negotiations fail, the region remains on a knife’s edge.

There’s no defined script for this conflict, which is playing out in real-time as an unpredictable confrontation with strategic reverberations across Southwest Asia and North Africa – including Sudan, where an ongoing civil war has already ravaged state institutions, displaced millions, and shattered fragile hopes for internal peace.

Understanding why this distant conflict matters to Sudan is not intuitive, but it is essential. From diplomatic distraction to shifting regional alliances and economic shocks, the US-Iran war is reframing the incentives and constraints that had shaped Sudan’s political process and prospects for peace.

Sudan’s fragile peace process has never been insulated from external influence. Over the past two years, diplomatic pressures from the US, Gulf states, European powers and UN envoys have been central to keeping ceasefire talks alive, and maintaining at least the illusion of negotiations between the Sudanese warring parties.

But the outbreak of US-Israeli strikes against Iran, along with Tehran’s sweeping retaliation, means Washington’s strategic bandwidth is increasingly limited. Major capitals are redirecting diplomatic attention towards preventing regional escalation, managing military alliances, and de-escalating cross-border missile exchanges. 

When great powers are consumed by more immediate crises, attention to other conflicts wanes – and leverage atrophies.

Sudan’s peace negotiations depend on that leverage: sanctions pressure, troop withdrawal incentives, and the threat of diplomatic isolation. A diverted US focus reduces the cost of non-compliance for Sudan’s belligerents. When global attention fractures, conflict actors often double down rather than compromise.

Regional realignments

In 2011, for example, when the global focus pivoted towards the Arab uprisings in Cairo and Tunis, diplomatic attention on Darfur temporarily collapsed – and violence surged anew. Neglect by major powers allowed local conflicts to deepen and international mediation efforts to stall. 

The lesson is clear: peripheral conflicts become more, not less, volatile when global attention is elsewhere.

Sudan today faces the same risk. As US policymakers balance regional crisis management, the pressure on Sudan’s warring factions diminishes. That delay does not just slow peace; it reshapes bargaining incentives on the ground.

Sudan’s strategic geography subjects it to another form of vulnerability. Its Red Sea coastline and control over Port Sudan place it squarely along one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. Up to 15 percent of global trade transits the Suez Canal corridor – a route whose stability matters to global oil markets and supply chains. Disruption here reverberates worldwide. 

In today’s interconnected security environment, no conflict exists in isolation – and ignoring these linkages risks leaving Sudan’s war to deepen in the shadows of greater powers

After the failure of US-Iran negotiations to end the war, concerns over maritime and energy security are growing, as Gulf states remain directly in the line of fire. When great powers prioritise security along critical maritime routes, their engagement calculus changes. 

Sudan may thus cease being a shadow conflict, and turn into a strategic asset – or a liability. External actors that once funded peace tracks or reconstruction projects may instead focus on ensuring that Port Sudan remains open, secure, and outside of rival influence.

Such reframing would carry real consequences for Sudan’s internal politics. If outside powers view Sudan through the lens of maritime security, their policy goals shift from democratic transition to transactional stability. Civil society actors and peace advocates may find themselves sidelined in favour of narrow geopolitical interests.

Meanwhile, regional powers threatened by Iran’s broader posture may further adjust their alliances. Gulf states, long invested in Sudanese factional alignments, could either deepen their military engagement to counter Tehran, or pull back to protect core interests closer to home. In either scenario, the external lifelines that have helped shape – and constrain – Sudan’s war would be reoriented.

That reorientation would not bring peace by default. It would bring competition over influence, fuelling further fragmentation if various Sudanese factions align with competing external patrons.

Economic shocks

Conflicts do not exist in isolation from economic forces – and today’s regional tensions are already driving volatility in global oil markets. Higher energy prices, supply chain uncertainties, and risk premiums threaten to worsen the economic environment for fragile states like Sudan. 

Sudan’s public finances were already in free-fall before the war, and they have only worsened since. Hyperinflation, fuel shortages, and runaway food prices now compound the humanitarian crisis. In such conditions, external economic shocks – like rising global oil prices – place even more pressure on ordinary Sudanese households and public services.

For conflict actors, economic deterioration often strengthens war economies. Control over resources – including smuggled fuel, gold mines, checkpoints on trade routes, and ports – becomes a survival strategy. In such environments, armed groups may see continued conflict as more economically rational than compromise.

Furthermore, external financial support may diminish, as global partners face their own budgetary pressures tied to regional crisis management. Gulf states grappling with defence expenditures and risk premiums might reduce funding for Sudanese proxies. Western governments consumed with preventing a wider regional conflagration may reallocate foreign aid and peace-building funds elsewhere.

The result is a hardening of conflict incentives. When economic survival becomes tied to control of contested resources, especially in the absence of credible postwar economic plans, actors are disinclined to disarm or negotiate.

The US-Iran conflict is thus more than a regional flashpoint. It poses a serious threat to Sudan’s fragile political and security architecture. An open-ended campaign framed by Trump as requiring sustained focus – accompanied by Iranian counter-attacks across the Gulf – reduces global attention on other crises, reshapes external incentives, and exacerbates economic pressures that benefit war economies over peace.

Sudan’s future will not be decided by missiles over Tehran or drones over the Gulf. But the strategic shifts triggered by those clashes – reduced diplomatic leverage, redefined geopolitical priorities, and destabilising economic shocks – will colour the context in which Sudan’s war and peace process evolve.

If global opinion pages are to confront this reality, they must reject the false separation between “primary” and “secondary” wars. In today’s interconnected security environment, no conflict exists in isolation – and ignoring these linkages risks leaving Sudan’s war to deepen in the shadows of greater powers.

As the Third International Sudan Conference convened this week in Berlin, the focus must extend beyond the meeting room, considering how the US-Iran confrontation is reshaping Sudan’s prospects. The conflict is not just a distant flashpoint, but an active driver of Sudan’s humanitarian crisis.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.