By Yousef Saba
April 28 (Reuters) – The United Arab Emirates has pursued an assertive foreign policy and carved its own sphere of influence across the Middle East and Africa, a strategy in the spotlight after it withdrew from OPEC and OPEC+ on Tuesday.
The grouping of oil exporters has traditionally served as an important forum for Gulf monarchies.
Below are key facts about the UAE’s foreign policy strategy and its role in specific countries.
WHAT IS THE UAE’S STRATEGY?
Abu Dhabi has prioritised countering what it regards as the destabilising threat of political Islam, particularly groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. It has relied on alliances and military interventions to advance this approach.
Senior Emirati officials have described the strategy as strengthening nation-states against extremists, though U.N. experts and Western officials have argued that it has at times fuelled conflict, a charge the UAE denies. Critics also say it bolsters authoritarian leaders.
The UAE has meanwhile doubled down on its relationships with the United States and Israel, with which it opened ties in the 2020 Abraham Accords, especially after coming under attack during the Iran war.
It views the relationship with Israel as a critical lever for regional influence and a unique channel to Washington.
Abu Dhabi has welcomed defence assistance from both Israel and the United States, drawing it closer to those partners while distancing it from traditional allies among neighbouring Gulf monarchies.
Its assertive regional stance and opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood have long put it at odds with fellow Gulf monarchy Qatar, and Turkey, whose ruling party is aligned with the Brothers.
More recently, the UAE’s foreign policy approach has led to friction with its largest neighbour, Saudi Arabia, which disagrees with Abu Dhabi’s positions in Yemen and other countries.
YEMEN
The UAE announced a withdrawal of its troops from Yemen in 2019, but has maintained influence through the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist group it trained and equipped.
It views the STC as a bulwark against the Islah party, a key faction in Yemen’s Saudi-backed government that the UAE regards as a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, and as a partner in securing maritime access.
Emirati backing for the STC led to a rare military escalation in southern Yemen with Saudi Arabia in December and January.
EGYPT
Abu Dhabi has been Cairo’s most important financial backer since Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi led the military overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013, viewing a secular Egypt as a firewall against an Islamist resurgence.
In 2024, Emirati sovereign wealth fund ADQ signed a $35 billion deal to develop a prime stretch of Egypt’s Mediterranean coast – a vital injection of hard currency while Cairo was strapped for cash.
SUDAN
U.N. sanctions monitors have described what they deemed credible allegations that the UAE provided military support to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, in the civil war against the Sudanese army.
Analysts have said the UAE distrusts the Sudanese Armed Forces chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, due to the presence within his ranks of Islamists from the rule of longtime former Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir, viewing Hemedti – a former partner in Yemen – as a counterweight.
The RSF has been accused, including by the U.S. and rights groups, of committing crimes against humanity and ethnically motivated mass killings in Darfur.
The UAE has strongly denied supplying arms to the RSF, emphasizing that its role is strictly humanitarian.
CHAD
The UAE has strengthened ties with Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Deby, signing a military cooperation agreement in 2023 and supplying armoured vehicles to the Sahelian state, which it views as a buffer against Islamist insurgents.
Attention has focused on the remote Amdjarass airport near the Sudanese border, where Reuters reported a surge in cargo flights.
While the UAE says it operates a field hospital and delivers aid for Sudanese refugees there, U.N. sanctions monitors and Western officials have alleged that the airstrip serves as a key logistics hub for supplying weapons to the RSF. The UAE has denied the charges.
LIBYA
The UAE was the primary foreign backer of the east Libya-based commander Khalifa Haftar, providing air support and equipment to his self-styled Libyan National Army during a 2019 offensive on Tripoli, according to U.N. experts.
The intervention aimed to topple the Tripoli-based, internationally recognised Government of National Accord, which included Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated factions and received military backing from Turkey.
While the civil war has been in a stalemate, the UAE remains a power broker, maintaining close ties to eastern factions and the Haftar family while engaging in diplomatic efforts to shape a government free of what it terms “extremist militias.” However, Haftar’s own coalition includes hardline Salafist factions.
SOMALILAND
The UAE has cultivated deep economic and security ties with the self-declared republic of Somaliland, as Abu Dhabi has frequently viewed the federal Somali government in Mogadishu as being too close to Qatar and Turkey.
The centrepiece of this strategy is DP World’s $442 million investment to develop and operate the Port of Berbera, creating a strategic alternative to Djibouti on the Gulf of Aden.
In 2017, Somaliland’s parliament voted to allow the UAE to build a military base in Berbera. While the base was later designated for civilian use, the UAE continues to train Somaliland’s security forces.
In December 2025, Israel became the first nation to officially recognise Somaliland’s independence, a diplomatic breakthrough that was facilitated by Abu Dhabi, according to analysts.
(Reporting by Yousef Saba; Additional reporting by Angus McDowall; Editing by Aidan Lewis and Ros Russell)